Shifting the Burden/Addiction: Soldiers Addicted to Drugs/Alcohol

A growing concern in the United States military (and the military of several allies, such as Canada) is the addiction to drugs and alcohol of its soldiers during and after combat tours. This problem is nothing new to the military – there are tales of “the Soldiers Disease” in the Civil War (soldiers addicted to morphine), black-and-white pictures of celebrities handing out cigarettes to Allied fighters in the World Wars, and the near-ubiquitous stereotype of the drunk, depressed Vietnam War veteran in movies and T.V. The United States is now seeing an increase in soldiers turning to illicit substances and alcohol to wash away Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSS) and a host of other troubles when they return from Iraq and Afghanistan.

A country should certainly take care of its warriors. They are people, after all, with families, lives, and human needs. They cannot be iron-men and -women all the time as they are when they are fighting for us half a world away. However, the fact presents itself that addiction to drugs and alcohol by soldiers is more than just a health concern. Many soldiers that have substance abuse problems are in between tours or, worse, in the middle of tours. If the problem is not reduced it could lead to a decrease in the reputation of the U.S. military (which could hurt international politics abroad and recruiting at home) and decrease in overall military effectiveness.

As demonstrated in the casual loop diagram shown below, soldiers look to drugs and alcohol to alleviate the physical and psychological problems that come with fighting in wars. The temporary relief they feel makes them less likely to seek true, fundamental help, such as they would get with professional counseling or a doctor-prescribed medicinal routine. The trouble is that this behavior does not get to the root of the problem, eventually increasing the size of the depression, pain, and terror and making the soldier more likely to abuse substances because it brings fast relief (loop R1). Alcohol and drug use only increases the problem (B1), but soldiers could break their addiction by utilizing more fundamental fixes that decrease the magnitude of the problem and encourage more efforts at a more fundamental fix (B2).

The situation seems as though it will continue to increase over the next few years. A 2002 study of 2,500 men stated what may seem obvious – men who are exposed to combat are more likely to “become dependent on alcohol and other drugs than civilians” (jointogether.org). Dr. Ian McFarling, Acting Director of the Army Center for Substance Abuse Programs, asserted in 2007 that the Army did not have a drug and alcohol problem, and that “less than one half of one percent of soldiers in Iraq have tested positive for illegal drugs” (military.com). Many soldiers, like Specialist Alan Hartmann of Fort Carson (Colorado), believe this is outright denial by Army leadership. Hartmann describes a Fort Carson which is plagued by soldiers getting drunk and high when they return from “the sandbox”, so that they can forget their troubles, and explicitly remembers many soldiers taking drugs in Middle East bases (military.com).

Whatever the true statistics are, helping soldiers fight off addictions is a battle worth having – it makes them healthier and happier, proves the U.S. takes care of its own, and increases the battle-readiness of its forces. The U.S. should look to increase counseling programs for soldiers, although it has to be admitted that the U.S. healthcare system is already in a tough spot. Canada is making a concerted effort to help its troops, attempting to increase the number of clinics, after the military mental-health establishment was greatly diminished following budget cuts in the 1990’s. In 2007, Canada saw a 300% increase in soldiers referred for addiction treatment (CBCNews.ca). Like Canada, the U.S. should try to “move heaven and earth to increase the number of mental health professionals” (CBCNews.ca).

Sources:

CBCNews.ca. “Rising number of soliders treated for addictions”. CBCNews.ca. September 28, 2007. Available online http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/09/28/soldiers-addictions.html.

JoinTogether.org. “Soldiers at Risk for Alcohol, Other Drug Addiction”. JoinTogether.org. January 9, 2002. Available online http://www.jointogether.org/news/research/summaries/2002/soldiers-at-risk-for-alcohol.html.

Lewis, McCarthy. “War Vets Fighting Addiction”. Military.com. November 26, 2007. Available online http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,156956,00.html.

Problem Articulation: Military Aid in Colombia

Problem Narrative

Despite the United States providing almost $5 billion in military aid to Colombia, the country continues to be plagued by a three-way violent struggle between communist guerilla groups, right-wing paramilitary units, and the Colombian government. The outcome of this situation is of critical importance to America, as Colombia is the world’s leading cocaine producer and is a hotbed of civilian kidnapping, massacres, corruption and political instability. Accurate generalizations that can be made about the relationship of military aid to political conflict in Colombia could be extremely useful in other analogous circumstances across the globe.

Behavior over Time

There are two key behaviors over time in this case: increasing military aid to Colombia from the United States and a stable-to-increasing amount of political violence in the country. In 1990, the United States provided $200 million under the “Andean Initiative” to fight drugs and train the Colombian military. Aid then fell in 1994 for various political reasons, but in 2000 the United States developed “Plan Colombia”, providing Colombia with $1.2 billion. Although Colombia ranked third in terms of U.S. aid in the 1990’s, and fifth in the present decade, aid to the country has increased in terms of raw dollars. Although “political violence” is somewhat nebulous, there is specific data to suggest that violent activities caused by Colombian instability – kidnapping, civil war, drug production, extortion – has been at least stable, if not increasing, since 1900! From 1899-1903, 120,000 people were killed in a Colombian civil war, and up to 300,000 were killed in a civil war from 1948-1957 (BBC). Major guerilla activity against the government began in the 1960’s, with nearly 23,000 people being killed in political violence in 1985 alone (BBC). 1,200 people were killed in political violence during the first ten months of 1987 (NYTimes.com). In the current decade, groups such as the Human Rights Watch continue to report that paramilitary and guerilla violence against civilians continues to plague the country. In 2005, 6,000 people were displaced from the Cauca region of Colombia due to violence (UNICEF), and there is emerging evidence that the government may be providing paramilitary groups with weapons and other resources under the table.

Goal and Scope

The goal of this analysis is to develop a model that will provide insight on the relationship between military aid and political violence in “fragile” states. U.S. policymakers need to know how a number of complicated factors influence whether aid contributes to the instability, and insight gained examining the Colombia case may be relevant in other circumstances, as well. The study will focus on factors that are relevant to military aid and political violence, such as how aid is allocated to military bases, “detailed” political violence data, paramilitary homicides during election years, election activity, and cooperation between the government and paramilitary groups. The study will use its ultimate assessment of “political stability” in terms of election participation from 1988-2005.

Questions

Several important questions to focus could help provide insight to policymakers:

1. Why does the government sometimes aid/encourage paramilitary groups?
2. What effect does the “Leahy Amendment” have on political violence?
3. Why does military aid not make the government more efficient at fighting guerillas?
4. What effect does military aid have on drug production?
5. Why is Colombia such a good environment for drug production/trafficking?
6. **What would happen to Colombia if military aid was reduced or cut off completely?

Sources:

1. New York Times. “In Colombia, Rising Violence Breeds New Doubts”. October 31, 1987. Available online http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/31/world/in-Colombia-rising-violence-breeds-new-doubts.html?pagewanted=1.
2. BBCNews. “Colombia timeline”. Available online March 2, 2010 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1212827.stm.
3. UNICEF. “Violence in Colombia displaces indigenous families”. April 29, 2005. Available online http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/colombia_26334.html.
4. Center for Global Development. “Bases, Bullets…Conflict in Colombia”. (Assigned reading).

Unintended Consequences of Funding Mujahideen 1979-1989

On Wednesday, February 10, 2010, former Texas congressman Charlie Wilson passed away of cardiopulmonary arrest at age 76(Yahoo). Wilson is famous for essentially forcing the United States Congress (through the Central Intelligence Agency) to fund the Afghan war against the Soviets during the 1980’s. Last year I read Charlie Wilson’s War, and it was incredible to read about what Charlie accomplished, and to see what an entertainingly rich character he was. However, it soon became obvious that the government’s obsession with killing Soviets during that decade caused narrow minded policymaking that would ultimately rear its ugly head in the smoldering wreckage of the Twin Towers twenty years later.

While reading, I became disappointed with how Wilson, the intelligence community, and other Washington leaders did not think of the long-term consequences of funding radical Islamist warlords in a region embroiled in civic chaos. No doubt, Wilson and all of America fought the Cold War and its proxy conflicts (Afghanistan, Vietnam, Korea) with nothing but good, honest intentions. They had seen great atrocities at Afghan refugee camps, had witnessed children maimed by Soviet “toy” bombs, and simply wanted to make America and the world a safer place by curbing communism. The secret funding of the Afghan war, however, has come down through history as a shining example of unintended consequences.

The mental model behind the policy was that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was a threat to U.S. national security (by means of the general spread of communism). The mountainous Afghan landscape and their “home turf” advantage made a successful insurgency by the Afghan war bands a legitimate possibility. They simply didn’t have the correct mix of modern weaponry to get the job done. Most importantly, they didn’t have the American shoulder-fired Stinger missile to neutralize the air superiority of the Soviet Hind attack helicopter. So, American policymakers gave the war bands money, weapons, and ammunition in abundance (famously buying up almost all of the world’s Tennessee mules to carry guns into the rugged terrain) and the tide shifted in favor of the Mujahideen (or “holy warriors”). In 1989, the last Soviet tanks crossed back out of Afghanistan, and the Berlin Wall collapsed soon after, the war having accelerated an already cracking Soviet Union. This withdrawal from Afghanistan was then thought to have contributed to a safer America.

The unintended consequence of this policy was that once there were no Soviet troops to fight, the temporarily-aligned war bands of Afghanistan turned on each other ferociously, sparking civil war and creating a lawless country in which terrorists such as Osama bin Laden (kicked out of Saudi Arabia and Sudan) could find fertile ground. Not to mention that many of the now infamous terrorist such as bin Laden got their fame fighting the Soviets. This feedback was delayed, and policymakers did not have a broad enough conception of the system to fully anticipate it.

The technical feedback loops can be viewed below in this simplified causal loop diagram of the situation:

Sources:

1. Yahoo News. "Former Texas Rep. Charlie Wilson dies at 76". http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100210/ap_on_re_us/us_obit_wilson

NFL Concussions

There has been a lot of buzz this year among sports news networks about the problem of concussions among current and former NFL players. NFL commissioner Goodell introduced a rule change in December of this year stipulating that players who are hit and exhibit concussion-like symptoms must not return to practice or a game for the rest of the day (1). Former NFL players have been very vocal this year about protecting the long-term health of league alumni (2). Current players are claiming that official statistics do not reflect the dozens of concussions players hide from in order to be able to continue play (3).

Concussions have certainly been a chronic issue in professional football for decades, but this year it seems that every broadcaster and sports anchor has been talking about it more than ever. Congress even called NFL administrators to the capital this winter in order to confront them on their ignoring of former players' health problems (4). Whether there truly have been a statistically significant number of concussions in the past few seasons, or whether the hype is simply due to greater media attention, the fact remains that concussions are a serious and chronic problem to be examined critically.

The problem of concussions in the NFL can be described as a problem that has evolved over time, and part of a broader system including many interdependent factors. “Hard”, measurable, elements of the system include the number of “missile style” tackles, the current concussion rate in the league, the number of players that play injured, equipment improvements and the size and speed of current football athletes. What is meant by “missile style” tackle is a type of tackle where one player essentially launches himself into another in order to bring him to the ground or force the ball out of his hands. Some analysts believe that the “missile” tackle is becoming more common, as players are bigger and stronger and therefore more difficult to tackle using the traditional “wrestling style” tackle (5). The league may be considering rule changes in order to encourage the safer “wrestling” tackle. Two “soft”, not easily measured, elements include the pressure on players to keep their jobs with their teams, and the overarching social pressure in football to be “tough” and “macho” (as playing injured is highly respected).

One simple but important reinforcing feedback loop includes the number of “missile” style tackles, concussion rate, equipment improvement, and the size and physicality of players. As players become larger, stronger, and faster, the frequency of “missile” style tackles increases. As more players employ this more dangerous form of tackles, concussion rates increase. As concussion rates increase, the league will be forced either through its own administrative decision making or through public pressure to, among other actions such as rule changes, improve equipment. Better equipment then makes players braver and more physical, knowing that their advanced gear will (theoretically) shield them from serious injury. As players strive to then become even stronger and faster, the reinforcing cycle begins again.

Both the reinforcing feedback loop and the complete connection circle can be viewed below.

Sources:

1. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/sports/football/03concussion.htm

2. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/sports/football/21concussions.html

3. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/18/sportsline/main5700174.shtml

4. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/sports/football/05concussions.html

5. http://www.cnn.com/2009/OPINION/12/13/greene.tackling.football/index.html

If I Were King

If I were king I would immediately institute a democratic form of government over my lands and resign from the throne. Kingship implies absolute power over the people in the kingdom, and following from that is a total lack of choice on the people’s part in regards to the king’s command. This total power takes away all meaning from human life.

Beyond crude survival, mankind’s ultimate goal is to spread goodness across the world. It is true that cultural relativism stipulates that one’s goodness may be another’s wickedness; America’s way may not be considered virtuous by a very different culture (think Al Qaeda’s Islamic fundamentalism). But it is a safe assertion also that the majority of the world could at least agree upon a general notion of goodness as characterized by less violence, less disease, less suffering, better quality of life, etc. and simply more global fraternity.

If this is true, having no choice but to obey a king makes even global peace a hollow victory. Goodness without free will is worthless. In essence, nobody has chosen to be peaceful - all have behaved well for fear of retribution. This is not virtue, it is blunt obedience. The pinnacle of mankind’s adventurous and sublime spirit would be choosing goodness even when there is no real reason to do so.

Tolerating another person when you hate them because acting on that hatred could mean life in jail is a totally different dynamic than tolerating them because you respect their human right to exist. The latter represents a spiritual evolution, and it simply wouldn't be possible with the specter of a crown and a rod overshadowing humanity’s infinite potential for cooperation and wisdom.